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Abstract
This paper seeks to add an economic contribution to the current debate
on using university licensing contracts to improve access to medicines in
developing countries. We build a simple model in which we have a univer-
sity licensing out an academic invention to a prot-maximizing pharma-
ceutical company. We compare three di¤erent types of licensing contracts
that the university might use to enhance access to pharmaceuticals in the
South: (1) an exclusive license limited to the North; (2) an exclusive li-
cense worldwide with a price cap in the South; and (3) an exclusive license
worldwide with a price cap in the South and a clause specifying that the
licensee would lose its exclusivity in the South if it does not supply the
Southern market. We show that in a simple model with asymmetric in-
formation on production costs the latter type of contract dominates the
two others.
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1 Introduction1
Many pharmaceutical products have their origins in research undertaken in
Northern universities. According to Cockburn & Henderson (1999), 15 of the
21 of the most important drugs introduced between 1965 and 1992 were de-
veloped using knowledge and techniques from research nanced by US public
funding. The degree of public involvement may vary considerably but Kneller
(2005) nds that of the 173 new chemical and biological entities approved by the
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) between 1998 and 2003, 26 had been
described in patents applied for by universities. Thus, it is common for a phar-
maceutical product to be discovered by academic researchers, patented by the
university and transferred to a pharmaceutical company for further development
and clinical trials. Several drugs of prime importance for the developing world
have followed this model of pharmaceutical development. Famous examples in-
clude Stavudine (d4T), Abacavir and Lamivudine. These three antiretrovirals
are listed in the World Health Organization (WHO) essential medicines list and
were discovered at Yale, Minnesota University and Emory University respec-
tively. In 2001, Stavudine received widespread publicity after pressure from
students groups led Yale University to renegotiate with its licensee, Bristol-
Myers Squibb, and to obtain a 30-fold price reduction for the drug in South
Africa.
Our research question is the following: assuming that the university cares
about access to its invention in developing countries (along with licensing rev-
enues), what clauses should the university include in the licensing contract to
reach its objective? We compare three di¤erent types of licensing contracts that
the university might use to enhance access to pharmaceuticals in the South: (1)
an exclusive license limited to the North so that in the South the licensee is
subject to competition from generic producers (equitable access license) ; (2)
an exclusive license worldwide specifying a maximum price that the producer
may charge in the South (target); and (3) a variant of the last contract where
the licensee loses its exclusivity in the South if it does not supply the Southern
market (target with punishment). We show that in a simple model with asym-
metric information on production costs, the target with punishment dominates
the two others.
Multiple scholars and groups have suggested that universities could and
should play a role in access to pharmaceutical through their licensing contracts.
In a Science editorial, Kapczynski, Crone & Merson (2003) argue that university
research should consistently be used to advance the global public good through
appropriate licensing policies. A special interest group, Technology Managers
1We thank Yochai Benkler, Iain Cockburn, Rochelle Dreyfuss, David Encaoua, Dominique
Foray, Claudio Panico, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, Suzanne Scotchmer, Hans-Berndt Schäfer,
Klaus Schmidt, Mathias Thoenig, Marie Thursby, Lorenzo Zirulia and especially Mathias
Dewatripont for very valuable advice and discussions. Views expressed in this paper and any
mistakes are our own.
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for Global Health, has been formed within the Association of University Tech-
nology Managers to "enhance academic research translation (...) in a way that
advances global health causes". Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, a
group of students and faculty from US universities, advocates that universities
make changes in both their principles and policies in order to improve access
to medicines in poor countries (Chokshi 2006; Chokshi & Rajkumar 2007).
Brewster, Chapman & Hansen (2005), from the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, seek to raise awareness among public sector managers
of the importance of managing intellectual property to facilitate humanitarian
access to pharmaceutical innovation.
One of the recommendations of the WHO commission on Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Innovation and Public Health is that "Public research institutions
and universities in developed countries should seriously consider initiatives de-
signed to ensure that access to R&D outputs relevant to the health concerns of
developing countries and to products derived therefrom, are facilitated through
appropriate licensing policies and practices." (WHO 2006a). The Strategic Ad-
visory Group of Experts, WHOs advisory group for vaccine policy similarly
recommended that "[t]o facilitate developing countries access to new inven-
tions, WHO should clearly articulate the responsibilities of both private and
public-sector intellectual property owners to consider developing-country needs
in the management of their intellectual property." (WHO 2006b)
The inclusion of clauses aiming at facilitating access is still very uncommon
in academic licensing contracts. The Socially Responsible Program Licensing
Program at the University of California, Berkeley, which aims at widespread
availability of technology and healthcare, including in the developing world
(Mimura, 2006) is a notable exception. However, many universities and acad-
emic institutions might be convinced to adopt humanitarian licensing policies for
their health-related inventions. Universities technology transfer o¢ ces under-
stand their mission as serving the public interest. For instance, MIT "supports
e¤orts directed toward bringing the fruits of MIT research to public use and ben-
et". Similar language is used by the TTOs of Caltech and of the University of
California which with MIT hold the three largest academic patent portfolios. Of
great practical importance are the licensing policies of the National Institutes
of Health (NIH) with its annual budget close to USD 30 billion. Given that the
mission of the NIH is support biomedical research to extend healthy life by
reducing illness worldwide(Salicrup et al.,2005, italics added) it is conceivable
that the NIH might adopt licensing policies aimed at facilitate access to the
results NIH-funded research in the developing world2 .
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the literature. In
section 3, we present our basic model. In section 4, we explain the intuition
2The o¢ ce of technology transfer from the NIH has already made a number of non-exclusive
technology transfer agreements in the eld of vaccines (Salicrup et al., 2005). However, NIHs
o¢ ce of technology transfer only licenses inventions from NIH intramural research which is a
small fraction of total NIH funding.
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for two extensions of the basic model: asymmetric information about demand
and uncorrelated draws between the production costs of the licensees and the
production costs of generic producers. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
2.1 Economic Literature
Our economic contribution draws mainly from the literature on the role of TTOs
in the process of technology transfer. Siegel et al. (1999) underline the role
of TTOs as bridge institutions between entrepreneurs and scientists, the two
parties being animated by di¤erent interests and goals. Jensen et al. (2003)
develop a theoretical model in which a TTO is both an agent for the university
central administration and for the faculty. In this model the TTO plays a role
of mediator between the interests of the central administration and that of the
faculty.
Thursby et al. (2004) and Macho-Stadler et al. (2005) analyze the role of
TTOs in resolving the problems of asymmetric information arising when scien-
tists and rms are not equally informed on the quality of the inventions that
are being commercialized and on the costs of commercializing these inventions.
Thursby et al. (2004) nd that milestone payments, annual payments and con-
sulting are common because moral hazard, risk sharing and adverse selection
all play a role when embryonic inventions are licensed. Macho-Stadler et al.
(2005) model the TTO as a technology seller who has an incentive to shelve
some of the less-successful university inventions in order to induce the buyers
to believe that university inventions are of high quality.
Thursby et al. (2004) and Macho-Stadler et al. (2005) assume that the
TTO is a revenue-maximiser whose utility increases with the revenue generated
by licensing contracts. Jensen et al. (2003) include in the objective function
of the TTO an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a license is
executed. In their model the TTO not only cares of licensing revenue but also
of the number of licenses executed. Belenzon and Schankerman (2007) assume
that the TTO has a dual objective of maximizing licensing revenue and local
economic development.
2.2 Legal and medical literature
A growing number of papers are being written in the legal and medical liter-
ature on the role universities could play in access to medicines. These papers
contain either advocacy only or combine advocacy for humanitarian licensing
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with discussions of the appropriate type of contracts that universities should
actually use. We focus on the discussions of the appropriate type of contracts.
One branch of the literature (Kapczynski et al. 2005, Chokshi.2006, Chokshi
& Rajkumar 2007; Chaifetz et al., 2007) outlines the equitable access license
and advocates its use. The equitable access license aims to facilitate unfettered
generic competition in poor countries (Kapczynski et al. 2005). Under the eq-
uitable access license, the contract o¤ered by the university does not include
exclusive rights for sales in the South (exclusivity is limited to high-income
countries). The licensee is also required to grant back to the university associ-
ated rights, i.e. all potentially exclusive rights the company holds or acquires
that could prevent a third party from producing or delivering an end prod-
uct(Chaifetz et al., 2007). The grant back is necessary because otherwise the
university licensees might patent improvements that may e¤ectively foreclose
generic competition even though the licensee does not have exclusivity in the
South on the initial university patent. Non-exclusive licenses for sales in the
South to both the original university invention and the associated rights are
automatically granted to generic producers upon notication. The equitable
access license notiers would be required to pay royalties in the range of 0 to
6%. This branch of the literature suggests that low monitoring and enforcement
cost as well as greater clarity are the main advantages of the equitable access
license.
The alternative which Brewster, Chapman & Hansen (2005) refer to as pos-
itive humanitarian conditionalityconsists of including clauses in the licensing
contract requiring the licensee to undertake certain steps to facilitate access to
the nal product in developing countries. Humanitarian clauses mentioned in
the legal and medical literature include the following: (a) selling at a reason-
ableprice in developing countries where reasonableis loosely dened or not
all (b) selling at a reasonable price where price is dened as cost of production
plus a small prot as percentage over cost (cost-plus pricing) (c) dene a price
ceiling (Eiss, Hanna & Mahoney 2007) d) selling a predened volume (Oehler
2007) (e) request the licensee to undertake clinical trials in developing countries
(Nelsen & Krattiger, 2007) (f) "create a worldwide marketing plan to licensed
products, the implementation of which it monitors through agreed upon bench-
marks" (Brewster, Chapman & Hansen 2005). The licensing contract could set
various types of penalties if the licensee does not fulll its obligation: temporary
increases in royalties, loss of exlusivity in general or for a specic region or the
payment of a ne (Oehler 2007).
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3 Basic model
3.1 Setup of the model
Our model is a game-theoretic model of technology licensing with two active
players: a licensor and a pharmaceutical company (consumers). The pharma-
ceutical company further develops and commercializes the invention made by
the licensor. We proceed to describe the players and how they interact.
Consumers. Demand for the pharmaceutical product is given by a linear
inverse demand schedule in both markets:
pN = aN   qCN
pS = aS   qCS
where qCN and q
C
S are the quantities consumed in the North and the South and
pN ; pS are the prices prevailing in the North and in the South respectively. The
choice of a specic functional form and specically of linear demand is made
for simplicity. The possibility of arbitrage between the two markets through
parallel imports or other means is excluded. While parallel imports are an
interesting issue in themselves, very substantial price di¤erences are observed
across pharmaceutical markets in the world and in particular between developed
and developing countries3 . The existence of these di¤erences is certainly not
consistent with widespread price arbitrage across markets. For the purpose of
this paper the assumption of separate markets appears to be satisfactory.
Licensor. The licensor is a university technology transfer o¢ ce whose task
consists in commercializing a patented technology issued from its university. We
dene the objective function of the risk-neutral licensor as a weighted average
of total licensing income and of the volume of sales.
V (M; qS ; ) =M +   qCS
Where M is licensing revenues in the form of a xed fee paid to the licensor,
qCS is the quantity of output consumed in the South, and  ( 0) is a para-
meter that reects the intensity of the humanitarian component in the licensor
objective function.
We think of the licensor as being interested in technology di¤usion and in the
number of consumers who have access to the nal good. Therefore, we include
output consumed in the South in the objective function of the licensor, along
with licensing revenues. For simplicity, output in the South enters linearly in
the utility function of the licensor. We do not include output consumed in the
North in the utility function of the licensor because thanks to higher standards
3For instance, hepatitis B vaccine is one hundred times more expensive in the United States
in the private sector compared to prices obtained by UNICEF for low-income countries.
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of living as well as health insurance and social security systems, few Northern
consumers lack access to medicines.
Our model features xed fees as the form of payment. In actual licensing
contracts, ad-valorem royalties are the most commonly used form payments. In
our model, the main di¤erence between ad-valorem royalties and xed fees is
that ad-valorem royalties introduce a distorsion by creating a wedge between the
producer real and perceived marginal cost (this distorsion is usually referred to
as the double marginalisation problem). In this context, humanitarian policies
such as limiting the exclusivity to the North or setting a lower price tends to have
the benecial e¤ect of reducing double marginalisation. We use xed fees rather
than ad valorem royalties because this allows considerable gains in simplicity
without altering the ranking between di¤erent types of contracts4 . Moreover the
distorsion introduced double marginalisation is probably quantitatively small in
practice5 .
Producer. We will occasionally refer to the producer as the licensee. The
risk-neutral producer, a pharmaceutical company, seeks to maximize its total
prots (which are its sales revenues minus its costs and the xed fee to be paid
to the licensor):
 = pN (qN )  qN + pS(qS)  qS   C(qN ; qS) M
Producer costs are partly xed (F ) and partly variable with a constant
marginal cost C(qN ; qS) = c  (qN + qS) + F . The xed cost F includes the
cost of R&D needed to bring the product to the market (in particular the
clinical trials, product registration, marketing) as well as all the non-variable
costs of production (e.g. setting up the plant and quality assurance system).
The marginal cost of production c includes the variable costs of production
which we assume to be directly proportional to the number of units produced.
Marginal cost can be either high cH or low cL (cH > cL)6 . Whether the marginal
cost is high or low is determined by Nature with the two states of the world
(s = H;L) occuring with equal probability.
Structure of the game. The ex ante distribution of costs is common knowl-
edge; i.e. at the beginning of the game both parties know that the marginal
cost of production may be either cH or cL with equal probability. The players
of the game interact in the following way:
1. The licensor o¤ers a contract to the producer.
4An earlier version of this paper was based on ad-valorem royalties but the use of xed
fees allows us to derive results analytically rather than numerically.
5For instance, examples of licensing contract renegotiation (such as a one time payment in
exchange for the remaining royalty obligation dues) once the product of the market are on the
market are rare . One would expect renegotiations to be frequent if double marginalisation
was quantitatively important.
6We assume that cH is not too large; specically cH < aS and cH < aN .
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2. The producer may accept or decline the o¤er. If it refuses, the game
ends; the producer receives an exogeneous reservation payo¤ of  while
the licensor receives 0. If it accepts it pays the xed fee M to the TTO
and the game proceeds.
3. Nature chooses the type of marginal cost. The producer privately learns
whether its cost is cH or cL.
4. The producer chooses his level of output in the North and in the South,
prots are realized.
Licensor of fers a
contract to the producer
Producer accepts or
rejects the contract
Nature chooses the type of
marginal cost. Producer
privately learns its type
Producer chooses his
level of output in the
North and in the South
The key element of the basic model is asymmetric information on marginal
cost. At the beginning of the game, the assumption is that neither party is in-
formed about the type of marginal cost. This reects the fact that the technol-
ogy is embryonic as most university inventions are (Thursby, Jensen & Thursby,
2001). In the life science eld, a typical university invention would be the knowl-
edge that a certain substance has a certain therapeutic e¤ect in vitro or in an-
imals. By the time the product is brought to the market, the producer, but
not the licensee, will have learned the marginal cost production. The type of
marginal cost can neither be deduced by the licensor or be veried ex post so
that it is not possible to write contracts contingent on the type of marginal cost.
Our model also features a take-it or leave-it o¤er by the licensor which is
typical in the literature on university-industry patent licensing or on patent
licensing more generally. The reservation payo¤ of the producer  can be inter-
preted as the bargaining power of the producer.
3.2 The rst-best
In this sub-section, we merge the two entities (licensor and producer) and nd
the quantities that maximises the sum their payo¤s. We do not entertain such a
merger as a realistic possibility but it allows us to abstract from the di¢ culties
associated with contracting and to dene a benchmark against which realistic
contracts can be assessed. In line with the standard approach in contract theory,
we will refer to the the quantities chosen by the merged entity and the associated
utility levels as the rst-best.
The merged entity maximises with respect to qN and qS the sum of the
payo¤s of both actors (V = (aN  qN )qN +(aS qS)qS ci  (qN +qS) F  
8
 + qCS ). The quantity consumed will be the same as the quantity produced
by the merged entity so qS = q
C
S . In its decision, the merged entity knows the
type of marginal cost. The rst-best level of output7 are qN(FB) =
aN cH
2 and
qS(FB) =
aS cH+
2 in state H and qN(FB) =
aN cL
2 and qS(FB) =
aS cH+
2
in state L. Plugging these quantities into the objective function of the merged
entity yields the level of utility attained at the rst best (see appendix).
3.3 The equitable access license
Under the "equitable access license", the university essentially limits the exclu-
sivity of the license to the Northern market and will grant an unlimited number
of licenses for sales in the South only (cf literature review for details). Since
under this contract there is free entry in the South, we will assume that the price
in the South, pS , will drop to the marginal cost. The cost of generic production
is perfectly correlated with the cost of production8 . Thus under the equitable
access license, the price in the South will drop to cL in state of the world L and
to cH in state of the world H. The quantities consumed in the South increase
to qCS = aS   cL and qCS = aS   cH respectively and the producer will not make
any prot in the Southern market. E¤ectively, the contract o¤ered to the rm
is an exclusive license limited to the North.
Problem of the producer. To nd the equilibrium of the game under this
contract, we rst consider the problem of the producer and solve the game
backwards. In the North, the producer behaves as monopoly and puts the
prot-maximising quantity qN =
aN ci
2 on the market. The producer will be
willing to accept the contract only if its expected prots is at least as high as
its outside option : (aN E(c))
2
4   F  M  
Problem of the licensor. The licensor can extract the rent of the producer
by setting the xed fee as MEAL =
(aN E(c))2
4  F    and the expected utility
of the licensor is VEAL =
(aN E(c))2
4   F    +   (aS   E(c)):
Proposition 1 The Equitable Access License leads to a payo¤ lower than the
level of utility attained at the rst-best level except for one particular value of 
( = aS   cH+cL2 ).
Proof. See appendix
7To be complete, when  is extremely high (  aS + ci), the merged entity would like to
set a price below which is not possible. In that case, the rst best is to set a price equal to 0
so that the quantity is aS .
8This assumption is relaxed in section 4.2 where we consider uncorrelated costs.
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3.4 A price target in the South
In this sub-section, we consider the following contract to be o¤ered by the
licensor: a xed fee and a maximum price t that can be charged in the South.
While we are not aware of universities using such contracts, price targets are
used in the eld of neglected diseases. For instance, the Meningitis Vaccine
Project has given funding, expertise and technology to Serum Institute of India,
a vaccine producer based in India, for the development of a meningococcal A
conjugate vaccine for use in African countries. In exchange, Serum Institute of
India has committed itself to charge a maximum price of half a US dollar on
the nal product. The Medicines for Malaria Ventures, a not for prot group
that support R&D for malaria drugs, typically requires its fundees to charge no
more than one US dollar per tablet.
Problem of the producer. In the North, the producer prot maximising quan-
tity is qN =
aN ci
2 as in the equitable access license. In the South, two cases
may happen. First, the target may be above the marginal cost (t  ci, i=H,L),
in that case the producer sells the quantity aS  t at price t. On the other hand,
if the price is below the marginal cost (t < ci, i=H,L), the producer will not
want to sell anything in the Southern market. Thus, the reaction function of
the producer in state of the world i is:
qiS(t) = aS   t if t  ci (1)
= 0 if t < ci
The participation constraint is di¤erent than under the equitable access li-
cense as the producer will typically be earning some prot from sales on the
Southern market:
(aN   E(c))2
4
+ (as   t)(t  E(c))  F  M   if t  cH (2)
(aN   E(c))2
4
+
1
2
(as   t)(t  cL)  F  M   if cH > t  cL
(aN   E(c))2
4
  F  M   if t < cL
Problem of the licensor. The problem of the licensor is to choose the xed
fee and the target t so as to maximize its payo¤ subject to the participation
constraint and the incentive compatibility constraints:
Max
M;t
M +   qCS
s.t. (2) and (1)
Since the producer is a monopolist on the Southern market, the quantity
consumed in the South is the same as the quantity produced by the monopolist
( qCS = qS(t) ).
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Lemma 1 It is never optimal for the licensor to set a target below cL. Under
very weak assumption on parameters, it is not optimal for the licensor to set a
target below cH .
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for this lemma is clear: the licensor will never want to set
a target below cL because the Southern market would not be served in either
states of the world and the producer would not make any prots in the South
which could be extracted through the xed fee. Similarly, he will not want to set
a target below cH (and above cL) because with probably one half the Southern
market would not be served and the producer would not make any prot in
the South which could be extracted through the xed fee. Since a target below
cH leads to a higher quantity in state of the world L, it is conceivable that
this might o¤set both the loss in revenues and the fact that nothing is sold in
the South in state of the world H. Very weak restrictions on parameters are
su¢ cient to rule this possibility out (see proof of the lemma for details).
Lemma 1 implies that cH is a lower bound on the price target. Clearly, the
participation constraint will be binding at the optimum and we can rewrite the
problem of the licensor as:
Max
t;tcH
(aN   E(c))2
4
+ (as   t)(t  E(c))     F +   (aS   t)
Deriving the rst order condition of the unconstrained problem and solving
for t we nd:
t =
aS    + E(c)
2
The lower bound on the target becomes binding when cH =
aS +E(c)
2 or when
 = aS +
1
2cL   32cH . The utility of the licensor under the target is indicated in
the appendix.
Proposition 2 If (and only if)   aS + 12cL   32cH , a contract with an
appropriately dened price target yields the same expected utility to the licensor
as the rst best.
Proof. See appendix.
The rst-best level of utility can be attained because the xed fee allows the
licensor to extract revenues from the licensee without distortion and, the desired
lower price in the Southern market can be implemented through the target9 .
9The realized level of prices in the South deviate from the rst-best level of prices because
the licensor sets a single target whereas in the rst best a di¤erent price is for the two states
of nature. However, thanks to the linearity of qS in the utility of the licensor the target leads
to the same expected utility as the rst best.
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However, in setting the target, the licensor is constrained by the fact that if
the target is too agressive, the producer will not supply in the South (at least
when the cost is high). A licensor that would set a price lower than cH in the
rst best cannot reach the desired level of prices with a target which causes a
deviation from the rst best.
Proposition 3 If   aS   12cL   12cH , the price target yields a higher utility
than the equitable access license to the licensor. If   aS   12cL   12cH , the
equitable access license yields a higher utility to the licensor than the price target.
Proof. See appendix.
3.5 A price target in the South with punishment
The idea developed in this paragraph is that it is possible to improve on the
simple contract with a target discussed in the previous paragraph by imposing a
due diligence clause. Specically, the contract could specify that if the producer
fails to supply the Southern market, the producer would lose its exclusivity in
the South (but not in the North). The loss of exclusivity would then allow
generic competition in the South as in the equitable access license. Thus, if the
producer does not sell in the South, the quantity consumed is qCS = aS   cL in
state of the world L and qCS = aS   cH in state of the world H.
Problem of the producer. The solution to the problem of the producer is
exactly the same as under the target of the previous sub-section. The potential
loss of exclusivity does not inuence its behaviour. If the target is above its
marginal cost, it will want to produce the same as before. If the target is below
its marginal cost, it will rather lose its exclusivity than sell at a loss.
Problem of the licensor. From the licensors perspective, the inclusion of a
due diligence clause matters. When the licensor sets a target between cL and
cH , the producer will not sell in the South in state H. Under the previous
contract that meant that the South was not served at all in this state of the
world. However under the present contract with a due diligence clause, the
producer would lose its exclusivity in the South. Generic producers, which are
not bound by the target would then supply the Southern market leading to a
quantity consumed in the South of qCS = aS   cH .
If  is low (aS  12cL  32cH  ), the price target with and without punishment
are identical since punishment never occurs. The solution of the game is the
same as for the price target without punishment.
If aS   12cL   32cH  , the optimal policy for the licensor is to set a target
below cH , in which case the producer sells in the South only in state of the
world L. In state of the world H, generic production occurs instead.
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Lemma 2 Under the contract specifying a target and with a due diligence clause,
it is optimal for the licensor for certain parameter values to set a target below
cH . Specically, the optimal target is (1) t =
aS+E(c) 
2 if   aS + 12cL   32cH
(2) t = aS+cL 2 if aS   cL    aS + 12cL   32cH (3) t = cL if  > aS   cL.
Proof. See appendix.
As before, the licensor will not want to set a target below cL, because the
Southern market would never be served or able to generate prots that can
be recovered through the xed fee. Whereas in the target without punishment,
setting a target strictly below cH (and above cL) was not attractive because the
licensor would risk that the Southern market would not be served should state
of the world H occur: This is no longer the case now and it becomes attractive
to set a target in the range between [cL; cH [ when the humanitarian component
in the licensors objective function has a relatively high weight.
Proposition 4 The payo¤ of the licensor is as least as good with the target
with punishment as with the target without punishment for all parameter values
and strictly better for   aS + 12cL   32cH .
Proof. See appendix
Proposition 5 The payo¤ of the licensor is as least as good with the target
with punishment as with the equitable access license for all parameter values
and strictly better for  < aS   cL.
Proof. See appendix.
3.6 Summary of results of the basic model
Table 1 summarizes the results of the basic model. For low values of  (zone A,
  aS+ 12cL  32cH) the optimal policy is a target, with or without punishment.
Since the quantity of output in the South has a low weight in the objective
function of the licensor, the desired level of output can (in expectation) be
induced by the licensor through an appropriately dened target without being
constrained by the fact that the producer may not nd optimal to supply the
Southern market at all. This constraint becomes very relevant for medium, high
and very high values of  (zone B, C and D,  > aS + 12cL   32cH) when the
licensor would like to induce its licensee to produce a higher level of output
through a price target set at a low level. For medium, high and very high values
of  (zone B, C and D,  > aS + 12cL  32cH), the licensor nds it optimal to set
a target at exactly cH to induce the licensee to supply the Southern market in
both states of the world. A higher quantity can be reached with the equitable
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license since generic competition drives prices to marginal cost in both states of
the world. As a consequence, when the humanitarian component has a high or
very high weight ( > aS   cL; zone C and D) in the objective function of the
licensor, it is better for the licensor to use the equitable access license rather
than a target (without punishment).
However, the target can be improved by including a due diligence clause
that species that if the Southern market is not served, the licensee will lose
its exclusivity in the South. When the contract includes such a punishment,
the licensor is not longer constrained by the fact that the licensee may not
supply the Southern market if the target is set too low. This is because generic
competition would step in to supply the Southern market thanks to the loss of
exclusivity. Therefore, for medium and high values of  ( > aS + 12cL   32cH ,
zone B and C), the target with punishment strictly dominates the other types of
contracts. For very high values of  ( > aS   cL), the target with punishment
and the equitable access license lead to the same outcome. The main result
of the basic model is thus that the target with punishment is at least as good
as the other types of contracts for all parameters values and strictly better for
some parameter values.
Figure 1: ranking of contracts in the basic model
4 Extensions of the basic model
4.1 Demand asymmetry
In the basic model, we have considered asymmetric information on the level
of marginal cost. An alternative would be to consider instead asymmetric in-
formation on the demand. It seems reasonable that the demand may not be
known when the contract is signed and that subsequently the rm may have
better information on the demand function. In the case of demand asymmetry,
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the setup of the model is the same as with cost asymmetry except that now the
marginal cost is always c and the demand parameters aN and aS can take the
values aLN and a
H
N : a
L
S and a
H
S respectively in states of the world L and H. The
simplest and most natural is to assume that when demand is low in the South,
demand is also low in the North. As in the basic model with cost asymmetry,
the type of demand is privately revealed to the producer after the signature of
the contract.
With the equitable access license, the solution of the game is essentially
identical to that of the model with cost asymmetry. However, demand asym-
metry leads to qualitatively di¤erent results under the target. Since there is
a single marginal cost level c, the choice of the TTO is limited to setting the
target above c, equal to c or below c (in the basic model it was also necessary
to consider a target between the two cost levels). Setting the target below c is
never optimal for the TTO because the Southern market would not be served.
The optimal target is to choose the price that implements the rst best in ex-
pectation unless the lower bound c is binding in which case the optimal target
is c. Since the target is never set below the marginal cost level, the producer
will serve the South in both states of Nature and a due diligence clause is never
triggered in equilibrium. Therefore, it does not matter whether the target is
with punishment or without.
Comparing the equitable access license and the target, there are only two
ranges of parameter values to consider. For a low  (  E(aS)   c), the rst-
best level of utility can be reached with the target but not with the equitable
access license. For a high  (  E(aS)  c) the rst-best level of utility can no
longer be reached. The target and the equitable access license lead to exactly
the same outcome.
Rather than considering demand asymmetry instead of cost asymmetry, we
could consider demand asymmetry on top of cost asymmetry. This is probably
the most realistic case: when the contract is signed, neither party has good
information on the demand and production cost; thereafter, the producer has
better information on the demand and cost level than the licensor. When de-
mand asymmetry is combined with cost asymmetry, the results are essentially
identical to the basic model with expectations on the demand parameters re-
placing the demand parameters. The comparison between the equitable access
license, the target with punition and the target without punishment yields the
same results as the basic model.
4.2 Generic production costs uncorrelated with produc-
tion costs
Another extension to the basic model is to assume that that the costs of generic
production are independent of the cost of the producer (licensee). As before,
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generic production is characterised by either high marginal cost or a low mar-
ginal cost, depending on the state of nature. When the licensee has a certain
marginal production cost however, is it equally likely that marginal cost of
generic production is low or high. Thus, four cases occur with equal probabil-
ity: (1) the licensee has cost cH and generic production is at cost cH (2) the
licensee has cost cH and generic production is at cost cL (3) the licensee has
cost cL and generic production is at cost cH (4) the licensee has cost cL and
generic production is at cost cL. It is assumed that the licensing knows the type
of generic production cost.
In this setup, the equitable access license has a sampling e¤ect. Sampling
e¤ects refer to the fact that when production costs are not perfectly correlated
among producers, competition between suppliers makes it more likely that one of
the competing producers has a low production cost (Armstrong & Sappington,
2006). Here, generic producers have the same costs among themselves; however,
benecial e¤ects of sampling emerge through competition between the licensee
and generic producers. In expected values, the quantity in the South is the same
as with perfectly correlated cost. However with uncorrelated costs and under
the equitable access license, the licensee can sometimes make a prot from sales
in the Southern market which was not the case in the basic model. Specically,
when the licensee is of type L and generic production is of type H, the licensee
can charge slightly below cH making a positive prot on sales to the Southern
market. At the equilibrium, the expected value of this prot is captured by the
licensor through the xed fee.
The target without punishment leads to the same outcome with perfect cost
correlation or without, because generic production never occurs in either case.
The target with punishment however becomes even more attractive than in the
basic model because it is now associated with a potential sampling e¤ect. If
the target is set between the two cost levels (i.e. between cL and cH), the due
diligence is triggered when the licensee is of type H. When that happens and
the costs are uncorrelated, the price in the South is either cL or cH with equal
probability. In the basic model the price was always cH when the due diligence
cause was triggered. The licensor will be tempted to set a target between the
two cost levels to take advantage of this sampling e¤ect. For this reason, cH is
never an optimal target.
With uncorrelated costs, the quantity with the target may be strictly larger
than with the equitable access. To see this, consider a target set at cL. In the
state of the world where the licensee has cost L and the generic production is
of type H, the quantity consumed in the South is aS   cL under the target
(the licensee nds it optimal to serve the Southern market at the target price).
In the same state of the world under the equitable access license, the licensee
sells at price slightly below cH leading to a quantity slighly above aS   cH (the
licensee is not constrained by any target but by the potential competition of
generic producers). In other states of the world the target and the equitable
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access license leads to the same quantities. The broader point is that if the costs
of the licensee are (sometimes or always) below the costs of generic production,
it is possible with a target with punishment to exploit this to achieve a greater
quantity than the quantity under equitable access license.
4.3 Other extensions
The basic model could be extended in various other ways that are not par-
ticularly interesting in terms of insights gained but could nevertheless have
important implications for the comparison between the three types of contract.
First, marginal costs may not be the same for generic producers and for the
licensee not only in the values they take ex post (as in section 4.2) but also in
expectation ex ante. For instance, it could be that the marginal cost of pro-
duction tends to be lower for generic competitors based in the South because
they face lower input costs. Generic producers may also have greater incentives
to invest in cost-reducing technology to improve their price-cost margin. Con-
versely, if marginal cost was not constant but decreasing, the licensee would
enjoy economies of scale. It is also possible that original producers use superior
production techniques thanks to their R&D intensive orientation. Thus, it is
unclear whether production costs are lower for original producers or for generic
producers. In the basic model we took a middle road by assuming that produc-
tion costs of the licensee and of generic production are the same. If the generic
production costs were deemed to be lower (in expectation) than the production
costs, that would favor the equitable access license over target and vice versa.
Second, reverse engineering may involve substantial costs for generic produc-
ers. High reverse engineering costs could make both the equitable access license
and the threat of generic competition ine¤ective leaving the licensor with a sim-
ple target as the only viable option (among those considered in this paper). The
costs of reverse engineering are probably very low for small molecule drugs as
evidenced by the rapid entry of generic producers after patent expiry. However,
they can be high in in the case of biologicals and vaccines due to the importance
of know-how in vaccine production (Milstien, Gaule & Kaddar, 2007).
Third, entering into the Southern market may involve a xed cost for the
producer (for instance clinical trials may have to be repeated). In that case,
the producer would nd it protable to supply the Southern market only if if
its prots in the South exceed the the cost to enter the Southern market. That
would further constrain the licensor in setting a price target and increase the
importance of including a due diligence clause in the licensing contract.
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5 Concluding remarks
Access to pharmaceuticals in developing countries depends on many factors and
in particular on the quality of local health systems. Nevertheless, the price of
pharmaceuticals is certainly an important determinant of access; and patent pro-
tection often has a signicant e¤ect on prices. In compliance with the agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), developing
countries have strenghtened their intellectual property laws (except least devel-
oped countries). This implies in e¤ect that generic competition will no longer
be possible for new pharmaceutical products. There are few prospects of the
TRIPS agreement being substantially changed to address the problem of ac-
cess to pharmaceuticals. While the relevant international legal framework may
not change, the behaviour of individual actors within the intellectual property
system may change. The adoption by Northern universities of humanitarian
licensing policies may help solve the problem of access to pharmaceuticals in
developing countries.
Which type of humanitarian licensing policies is most appropriate is still
an open question. This paper sought to bring an economic contribution to the
debate. Arguably one of the main problem in setting a maximum price (price
target) in advance is that the licensor does not know enough about the cost
of production or the demand. Our model takes this into account by assuming
that both the licensor and the producer are not well informed about costs when
the contract is signed and that afterwards the producer knows his costs but not
the licensee. The problem of the price target under these conditions is that the
licensor cannot set a target too low because the producer would not produce
if its cost of production turns out to be higher than the target. The equitable
access license (which roughly amounts to granting non-exclusive licenses for sales
in the South) is better than the target when the university places a relatively
high importance on the access objective because it leads to higher quantities.
However, the target can be improved by a due diligence clause that species
that the licensee would lose its exclusivity in the South if it does not supply
the Southern market. This allows the licensor to set a lower target because if
the costs of production turn out to be higher than the target, the licensee will
not supply the South but generic producers will. We showed that in our simple
model the target with the due diligence clause was at least as good as the two
other contracts for some parameter values and strictly better for others. The
main message of the paper is thus that the threat of generic competition may
be stronger than its actual implementation.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Utility attained by the licensor under di¤erent types
of contracts
Utility at the rst best
VFB=
(aN E(c))2
4 +
(aS E(c))2 2
4  F    + aS E(c)+2
Utility under the equitable access license
VEAL=
(aN E(c))2
4  F    +   (aS E(c))
Utility under the target with or without punishment when   aS + 12cL   32cH
(aN E(c))2
4 +
(aN E(c))2 2
4  F    + aS+ E(c)2
Utility under the target without punishment when  > aS +
1
2cL   32cH
(aN E(c))2
4 +
1
2 (aS cH)(cH cL)  F    + (aS cH)
Utility under the target with punishment when aS   cL> > aS + 12cL   32cH
Vpunishment =
(aN E(c))2
4 +
(
aS+cL 
2  cL)(aS 
aS+cL 
2 )
4   F    +   aS+ E(c)2
Utility under the target with punishment when  > aS   cL
Vpunishment =
(aN E(c))2
4   F    +   (aS   E(c))
6.2 Proof of proposition 1
In section 3.2, we found that the utility at the rst best is:
VFB=
(aN E(c))2
4 +
(aS E(c))2 2
4  F    + aS E(c)+2
In section 3.3, we found that the utility of the licensor under the equitable
access license is: VEAL =
(aN E(c))2
4   F    +   (aS   E(c))
Substracting VEAL to VFB we obtain: VFB   VEAL = (aS E(c))
2 2
4 +  
aS E(c)+
2     (aS   E(c)) which can rewritten as 14 (aS   E(c)  )2.
This expression is strictly positive unless  = aS   E(c) in which case it is
exactly 0. Thus the equitable access license does not reach the rst best except
when  = aS   E(c).
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6.3 Proof of lemma 1
First, we show that it is never optimal to set a target below cL. Setting a target
below cL yields a payo¤ of
(aN E(c))2
4   F    to the licensor which is strictly
lower than then the payo¤ from a target set at cH (
(aN E(c))2
4 +
1
2 (aS cH)(cH 
cL)  F    + (aS   cH)).
Second, we show that it is not optimal to set a target below cH . When
choosing a target between cH and cL, the best the licensor can do is to set a
target equal to aS+cL 2 (which yields the rst-best level of output in state of the
world L). The utility of the licensor is then (aN E(c))
2
4  F  + 12 (aS cL)
2 2
4 +
1
2  aS cL+2 : This utility is strictly lower than the payo¤ from a target set at
cH (
(aN E(c))2
4 +
1
2 (aS  cH)(cH   cL) F  +(aS  cH)) under the following
two conditions: a) cH   cL < 2(aS   cH) i.e. the di¤erence between the two
cost levels must not exceed twice the di¤erence between the intercept and cH
and b)  < 3aS   4cH + cL + 2((aS   cH)(2aS   3cH))1=2 which is a very large
of  (at this value of  the rst-best is to set a price equal to zero in the South
in both states of the world).
6.4 Proof of proposition 2
The utility at the rst best is:
VFB=
(aN E(c))2
4 +
(aS E(c))2 2
4  F    + aS E(c)+2
When   aS + 12cL   32cH ,the utility under the target is (aN E(c))
2
4 +
(aN E(c))2 2
4  F  +   aS+ E(c)2 which is the same as the rst-best. When
 > aS +
1
2cL   32cH , the di¤erence between the utility at the rst best and
the utility under the target is: VFB   Vtarget = (aS E(c))
2 2
4 +aS E(c)+2  
1
2 (aS   cH)(cH   cL)  (aS   cH) which simplies to 14 (aS   32cH + 12cL   )2
which is strictly positive.
6.5 Proof of proposition 3
If   aS+ 12cL  32cH , the target reaches the level of utility of the rst best while
the equitable access license does not (see previous proofs). Thus the price target
dominates the equitable access license over this range of parameter values.
If   aS + 12cL   32cH , we compare the payo¤ of the licensor with a
target equal to cH to the payo¤ of the licensor with the equitable access li-
cense: Vtarget   VEAL = 12 ((aS   E(c))2   2) + (aS+ E(c)2   as   E(c)) =
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(aS   E(c))  (aS   E(c)   ): Since aS   E(c) is always posititive, the last
expression is positive for aS   E(c)   and negative otherwise.
6.6 Proof of lemma 2
If   aS + 12cL   32cH , the rst best can be reached with the same target as
without punishment (t = aS+E(c) 2 ).
If  > aS+ 12cL  32cH , the licensor might want to (i) set a target at cH or (ii)
a target between cH and cL First, we compute the optimal target if the licensor
chooses option (ii). This amounts to Max
t;t<cH
(aN E(c))2
4 +
1
2 (as   t)(t  cL) 
 F +   12 (aS   t) and the solution is target t = aS +cL2 . The utility of the
licensor with this target is:
Vt<cH =
(aN E(c))2
4 +
(
aS+cL 
2  cL)(aS 
aS+cL 
2 )
4   F    +   aS+ E(c)2
whereas the utility with a target at cH is Vt=cH =
(aN E(c))2
4 +
1
2 (aS cH)(cH 
cL)   F    + (aS   cH): The di¤erence Vt<cH   Vt=cH simplies to 18 (aS  
2cH + cL   )2 which is always strictly positive (  aS + 12cL   32cH implies
.aS   2cH + cL    > 0). Consequently, the optimal target when aS   cL >  >
aS +
1
2cL   32cH is t = aS +cL2 .
When  > aS   cL the optimal target is cL. This target cL is optimal in a
weak sense because any price below cL including t = aS +cL2 (which is below
cL when  > aS   cL) leads to the same payo¤. In fact, when the price is below
cL it is generic producers rather than the licensee that supply the South. In fact
the target with punishment amounts to an equitable access license since both
parties know that the due diligence clause will be triggered in any state of the
world if the target is set below cL. As shown in proposition 5, the equitable
access license and the target with punishment yield exactly the same payo¤
when  > aS   cL (the quantities in the South in the respective states of the
world are the same and the licensing revenues are equal (aN E(c))
2
4      F to
in both cases).
6.7 Proof of proposition 4
Case 1:   aS + 12cL  32cH , the due diligence clause is never triggered and the
optimal target is the same with or without punishment (t = aS+E(c) 2 ). The
two contacts are identical.
Case 2: aS   cL    aS + 12cL   32cH . Without punishment the optimal
target for these parameter values is t = cH (see lemma 1) Vno punishment =
(aN E(c))2
4 +
1
2 (aS   cH)(cH   cL)  F    + (aS   cH). With punishment the
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optimal target for these paramater value is t = aS+cL 2 (see lemma 2) and the
utility of the licensor is Vpunishment =
(aN E(c))2
4 +
(
aS+cL 
2  cL)(aS 
aS+cL 
2 )
4  
F + aS+ E(c)2 . The di¤erence Vpunishment Vno punishment can be rewritten
as 18 (aS   2cH + cL   )2 which is always strictly positive (  aS + 12cL   32cH
implies .aS   2cH + cL    > 0)
Case 3:  > aS   cL. Without punishment the optimal target and utility for
these parameter values is the same as in case 2. With punishment the optimal
target for these paramater value is t = aS+cL 2 (see lemma 2) and the utility of
the licensor is Vpunishment =
(aN E(c))2
4  F    +   (aS  E(c)):The di¤erence
Vpunishment  Vno punishment can be rewritten as 12 (cH   cL)  (+ cH   aS). This
expression is strictly positive since  > aS   cH is implied by  > aS   cL:
6.8 Proof of proposition 5
For values of  such that   aS + 12cL   32cH , the target with punishment
yields the rst-best level of utility while the equitable access license does not
(see propositions 1, 2 & 4).
For values of  such that aS   cL >   aS + 12cL   32cH , the utility of the
licensor with the target is Vtarget =
(aN E(c))2
4 +
(
aS+cL 
2  cL)(aS 
aS+cL 
2 )
4  
F + aS+ E(c)2 . The utility of the licensor with the equitable access license
is VEAL =
(aN E(c))2
4   F    +   (aS   E(c)). The di¤erence Vtarget   VEAL
simplies to: 18 (aS   cL   )2.
For values of  higher than (or equal to) aS cL, the equitable access license
and the target with punishment yield exactly the same payo¤ (the quantities in
the South in the respective states of the world are the same and the licensing
revenues are equal (aN E(c))
2
4      F to in both cases).
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